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Abstract
Existing learning models attribute failures to learn to a lack of data. We model a different
barrier. Given the large number of dimensions one could focus on when using a technology,
people may fail to learn because they failed to notice important features of the data they pos-
sess. We conduct a ﬁeld experiment with seaweed farmers to test a model of “learning through
noticing”. We ﬁnd evidence of a failure to notice: On some dimensions, farmers do not even
know the value of their own input. Interestingly, trials show that these dimensions are the ones
that farmers fail to optimize. Furthermore, consistent with the model, we ﬁnd that simply hav-
ing access to the experimental data does not induce learning. Instead, farmers change behavior
only when presented with summaries that highlight the overlooked dimensions. We also draw
out the implications of learning through noticing for technology adoption, agricultural exten-
sion, and the meaning of human capital.
∗We thank Andy Newman, Matthew Rabin, and Andrei Shleifer for helpful comments, as well as seminar partici-
pants at the Behavioural Decision Theory Conference, Berkeley, BU, and Harvard/MIT.
11 Introduction
Learning models suggest several reasons why people may fail to operate on the productivity fron-
tier. Experimentation can impose both real costs and opportunity costs. Even with experimen-
tation, updating may be slow because outcomes are noisy (Besley and Case 1993, 1994). Data
from neighbors’ experiences is only partly helpful: their contexts may differ, and some technolo-
gies may require actual use in order to learn (Jovanovic and Nyarko 1996; Foster and Rosenzweig
1995; Conley and Udry 2010). In all these cases, the bottleneck is data: people fail to learn be-
cause because they lack sufﬁcient data to learn from. In this paper, we highlight another reason
why people fail to learn.
Imagine having dinner at a friend’s house, where you watch him cook steaks using a cast iron
skillet. These steaks are so good that you buy a skillet and decide to try making them yourself.
Your friend’s kitchen and cooking skills are simliar enough to yours that, under traditional learning
models, you should end up with similar steaks. Sure enough, the ﬁrst batch of steaks is delicious.
The second, though, is not as good and they get worse after that. What happened? You failed to
notice something important. When washing his skillet, your friend did not use any soap. Washing
the skillet with soap removes the “seasoning” and results in a sticky surface that cooks unevenly
and produces less ﬂavor. Not noticing this, you washed your skillet before cooking. This failure
to notice was not by chance. Watching your friend cook, there was an endless array of details
you could have paid attention to, from the temparature in the room to the color of his apron.
You decided which details to encode or “notice” based on your beliefs. Since you did not believe
washing (or lack thereof) had anything to do with cooking, you did not pay attention to that.1 There
was no lack of data, but a failure to notice something in that data. We call this learning through
noticing.
Some practical examples also match this pattern of learning through noticing. For many years,
doctors had the data they needed to prevent operating room infections. But the importance of a
1If your friend watched you attempt the recipe, she could point out your error. However, it is not the case that
explicit communication always bridges this gap. For example, she would need to know your tendency not to notice
certain details and to tailor her instructions accordingly.
2sterile operating room was not recognized until the germ theory of disease spread (Nuland 2003,
Gawande 2004). Until then, doctors did not learn that they themselves were the source of in-
fections. Similarly, recent evidence suggests that Indian textile manufacturers fail to adopt key
management practices, such as keeping the factory ﬂoor free of waste, despite exposure to natural
variation that points to the importance of those practices (Bloom et al. 2012). Other work suggests
that shopkeepers in Kenya fail to attend to the fact that keeping a hefty stock of small change can
improve their proﬁtability (Beaman et al. 2012).
We use Schwartzsteins’s (2012) model of selective attention to build a theory of learning
through noticing in the context of technology adoption and use. Agents in the model wrestle with
numerous dimensions in learning how to use a technology. A farmer, for example, must decide
on the timing of planting, the depth and spacing of seeds, the amount of fertilizer to use, when to
use it and so on.2 In addition to these decisions, the agent in our model must also decide which
dimensions to attend to, where attending is costly. The agent is “Savage rational”: he updates
and chooses in a Bayesian way given prior beliefs and the costs of paying attention. The model
highlights a feedback loop. An agent who believes that a particular dimension does not matter
may not focus on it. As such, he may never process freely available data that could contradict
his false belief. This generates an empirical prediction: a failure to learn comes from a failure to
notice. So learning failures should be concentrated on dimensions where agents report ignorance,
i.e., where they cannot answer key questions about what they themselves do (or have done) along
that dimension.
We test the model’s predictions using data from a ﬁeld experiment with seaweed farmers. Sea-
weed is farmed by attaching strands (“pods”) to lines submerged in the ocean. As in the model,
a large number of dimensions might affect yield.3 We focus on the spacing between the pods and
2While the model presented in this paper is speciﬁc to issues related to technology adoption and use, Schwartzstein
(2012) presents a general model of belief formation when an agent is selectively attentive. For other more general
approaches to modeling limited attention in economic settings, see Sims (2003), Bordalo et al. (2012), Koszegi and
Szeidl (2011) and Gabaix (2011).
3For example, the strength of the tide, the time of day, the temperature, the tightness with which pods are attached,
the strain of pods used and many other dimensions could matter. This is a persistent issue to keep in mind. We focus
on two dimensions for parsimony. Actual demands on attention are larger than this narrative suggests since these are
two of many dimensions that all must be attended to (or not).
3the size of the pods. To look for failures to notice, we directly asked farmers what they know about
their own production techniques and production functions. As one might expect, farmers are quite
knowledgeable about many dimensions. However, they do report ignorance on one key dimension:
they do not know the size of pods they use (and few will even venture a guess about what the
optimal size should be). To test whether this failure to notice translates into a failure to learn, we
conducted experiments on farmers’ own plots, varying both pod size and pod spacing. On pod
spacing – which farmers tended to notice – our ﬁndings suggest they were close to the optimum.
In contrast, on pod size – which farmers did not notice – our ﬁndings suggest they were far from
the optimum.
To more sharply test the model, we examine farmers’ response to the trial. The model predicts
that, even though the trials generate data to learn from, simply participating in them should not
affect pod size. The intuition is that the farmers’ own behavior generated an experiment of sorts
every season – their failure to notice size created random variation in pod sizing. In effect, the
trial presents farmers with similar data that they already had access to, but did not notice. Consis-
tent with this prediction, we ﬁnd little change in farmers’ behavior following participation in the
trial. The model further suggests a way to induce learning: providing a summary of the data that
explicitly highlights neglected dimensions should affect behavior. Consistent with this prediction,
we ﬁnd that farmers changed their production methods after we presented them with the trial data
on yield broken down by pod size (from their own plot).
The analysis described so far focuses on how to use a technology. We extend the model to study
the decision of whether to use a technology. A key result here is that agents can experience pre-
dictable disappointment. Agents can observe data – perhaps in a demonstration – that leads them
to believe that they can use a technology proﬁtably. Yet, when they adopt it, they systematically
earn negative surplus in a way that is predictable to an outsider who has knowledge of the produc-
tion function and what agents attend to. Disappointment happens –as in the skillet example– when
agents do not notice all of the dimensions necessary for effective use. We re-interpret some exist-
ing evidence on technology adoption in this light, prominently the fertilizer experiments by Duﬂo,
4Kremer and Robinson (2008). This logic also provides a different perspective on agricultural ex-
tension activities where farmers are shown how to use technologies. In our model, the effectiveness
of extension depends on whether the agents’ priors lead them to notice the relevant features of a
technology. We call a technology “ﬁlter congruent” if agents’ beliefs on what to notice match up
well with the dimensions needed to effectively use the technology. Non-ﬁlter-congruent technolo-
gies are prone to disappointment. We generalize this concept to develop a broader understanding
of human capital. From a learning point of view, human capital is more than the accumulated
knowledge of what has worked. It is also the accumulated understanding of what to notice.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model of learning through noticing given
a choice of technology and develops our experimental hypotheses. Section 3 describes the experi-
mental design and data. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 extends the model to consider the
technology adoption decision and further applications. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of
broader issues, for example how learning through noticing changes our understanding of the role
of human capital, experience, and education in promoting the efﬁcient use of technologies.
2 Basic Model
2.1 Setup
Consider a farmer whose learning problem is how to set inputs to maximize proﬁts. While, in
reality, there are many dimensions, we assume that the farmer knows his production technology
up to a single input, s ∈{ 1,2,3,...,S}, in order to simplify the model. Over the course of two
periods, t =1 ,2, the farmer collects data that may inform his choice of s. At a given period
of time, the farmer chooses which level of s to use for each of N pieces of land. He can either
measure to guarantee a particular level, which costs m>0, or choose not to measure. If the
farmer does not measure, then the input level is random and uniformly drawn across possible
levels S = {1,2,...,S}. To illustrate, in our seaweed application, the farmer may not know the
optimal pod size. In every period, he has the opportunity to either choose particular sizes for each
5of his N pods or not to precisely measure them, which would thus lead to random variation in pod
sizes.4
Given input s, the yield from a piece of land p at time t is given by:
ypt = f(spt)+εpt, (1)
where εpt ∼N (0,σ2
ε) is a random shock that is independent across time and pieces of land.
Denote the true production process (the true value of f(·)) by f0(·) and the value that maximizes
this function by s0 (for simplicity, if there are multiple such values, pick one). The farmer is
initially uncertain whether and how the input affects the yield – that is, about f0(·) – and updates
his beliefs over time.
The farmer attaches prior weight π ∈ (0,1) to a model, P, in which s affects yield and weight
1 − π to a model, NP, in which s does not affect yield.5 Under model P,
f(s)=θ(s), (2)
where each θ(s), s ∈S , is independently drawn from a N(µ,σ2) distribution. Under this S
parameter model, yield almost surely varies in the input. On the other hand, under model NP,
f(s)=θ, (3)
where θ is drawn from a N(µ,σ2) distribution. Under this single parameter model, yield does not
vary in the input. Combining Equations (1)-(3), under model P:
ypt = θ(spt)+εpt (4)
4When the farmer does not measure, he also has the option of paying attention to the relationship between the input
level and the yield. This choice variable will be discussed in detail after specifying the environment.
5To remember these labels, P is short-hand for “pod size matters” in the main application.
6while under model NP,
ypt = θ + εpt. (5)
Fully Attentive Benchmark
A fully attentive farmer updates his beliefs about whether and how the input affects yield using
Bayes’ rule, as applied to the ﬁrst period history:
h =( yp1,s p1)
N
p=1. (6)
To illustrate, the standard updating formula for a normal learning model (e.g., DeGroot, 1970)
implies that, given h, a farmer’s posterior expectation of yield for a given level of s￿ is:
E[f(s
￿)|h]=π
+E[f(s
￿)|h,P]+( 1− π
+)E[f(s
￿)|h,NP]
= π
+E[θ(s
￿)|h,P]+( 1− π
+)E[θ|h,NP]
= π
+
￿
σ2
ε
σ2
ε + n(s￿)σ2µ +
n(s￿)σ2
σ2
ε + n(s￿)σ2 ¯ ys￿
￿
+( 1− π
+)
￿
σ2
ε
σ2
ε + Nσ2µ +
Nσ2
σ2
ε + Nσ2 ¯ y
￿
,
(7)
where π+ is the posterior probability placed on model P, n(s￿) stands for the number of times the
farmer used input level s￿ in the ﬁrst period, ¯ ys￿ is the average ﬁrst-period yield across pieces of
land with input level s￿, and ¯ y is the average ﬁrst-period yield across all pieces of land.
Selective Attention
We follow Schwartzstein (2012) and make the additional assumption that the farmer must expend
effort in order to attend to the input level relative to yield, so he is only selectively attentive. The
farmer faces a cost e ∈ (0,m) of keeping track of the input level applied to a given piece of land
if it was not measured, and will do so only if the expected beneﬁts from doing so, i.e., from being
able to use this information when choosing the input level in the next period, exceed this cost. In
7the second period, he updates his beliefs not based on the full history h, but on what he noticed,
i.e., based on:
ˆ h =( yp1, ˆ sp1)
N
p=1, (8)
where
ˆ sp1 =

  
  
sp1 if the farmer kept track of the input level applied to piece of land p
∅ if the farmer did not keep track of the input level applied to piece of land p.
(9)
2.1.1 Learning by Doing
The farmer is risk neutral and maximizes the expected undiscounted sum of yield across periods,
net of the costs of measuring and attending to the input.6 Timeline 1 summarizes the ﬂow of
activities.
1 2 
Farmer chooses input 
levels.  If he does not 
measure, he chooses 
whether to attend to 
the relationship 
between s and yield. 
Farmer chooses input 
levels.  
Timeline 1: Learning by Doing
Proposition 1. 1. If: (i) π is sufﬁciently low or (ii) e and m are sufﬁciently large, then the
farmer does not measure or attend to the input level applied to any piece of land in the ﬁrst
period. In this case, the farmer’s posterior expectation of f(s) does not vary in s, and he
chooses not to measure in the second period.
6Implicitly, we are making the simplifying assumption that the differential cost to the farmer of using different
inputs is negligible.
82. If: (i) π is sufﬁciently large (ﬁxing sufﬁciently low e and m) or (ii) e and m are sufﬁciently
low (ﬁxing π), then the farmer attends to the input level applied to at least one piece of land
in the ﬁrst period. In this case, the farmer’s posterior expectation of f(s) almost surely
varies in s so long as σ2
ε > 0. He either measures the input level with the highest associated
posterior expectation of f(s) in the second period or does not measure.
Proof. See the Appendix A for all proofs. ￿
Proposition 1 says that if the farmer does not place much initial weight on an input level, or
the cost of measuring and attending to the input is sufﬁciently large, then he will not measure or
attend to that input. Such a farmer will continue to be indifferent between input levels despite
having access to readily available information about the relationship between the input level and
yield. He will not know what he does nor will he change his practice with respect to that input over
time. This prediction is independent of the underlying production function f0(·): the farmer can
make arbitarily large mistakes by failing to attend to the input, as an incorrect belief that an input is
unimportant is self-conﬁrming given selective attention (Schwartzstein 2012).7 On the other hand,
if the farmer places enough initial weight on the input and the cost of measuring and tracking that
input is sufﬁciently low, then he will attend to the input in the ﬁrst period. In this case, he will
come to expect some levels to achieve greater yields than others and may measure the input in the
second period.8
To observe the potential loss from the farmer not paying attention, consider the limiting situ-
ation where σ2
ε =0 , so that a single observation using input level s￿ is enough to identify f0(s￿),
and where N is very large relative to S, so that a farmer is likely to learn the optimal input level s0
when he does not measure but attends to the input level in the ﬁrst period. In this case, when the
farmer does not measure but attends in the ﬁrst period he is likely to make the same choice in the
second as if he were endowed with knowledge of the true production function (i.e., he will make
7This prediction is not shared by most economic models of inattention (e.g., Sims 2003 or Gabaix 2011), since they
abstract from learning by assuming that agents are endowed with perfect knowledge of the mapping between inputs
and payoff relevant outputs. In such models, agents do not attend to an input only if it is truly not very important.
8Statements regarding almost sure convergence are with respect to the true underlying distribution, i.e., conditional
on f0(·).
9the “optimal” choice, s0). This is not true when he does not attend in the ﬁrst period. Supposing
that f0(s0) − m is large relative to 1/S
￿
s￿ f0(s￿), not paying attention results in a substantial
income loss. This generates the following testable predictions:
Prediction 1. Farmers may not attend to all dimensions of the production function.
Prediction 2. When farmers do not attend to an input dimension, choices along that dimension
may be far from optimal. When farmers attend, choices are more likely to be optimal.
In addition to these predictions, the baseline model also illuminates methods to diagnose fail-
ures to notice and the resulting failures to learn. In particular, it suggests a simple way of testing
whether farmers are attending to an input: elicit beliefs about current practices and best practices.
When farmers do not attend, the model predicts that they will not precisely know their previously
used input levels, nor will they have an opinion about the relationship between those levels and
yield.
Finally, note that the model also implies that farmers are less likely to notice an input when
the cost of attending to that input is higher or when the option value of paying attention is lower.
Put differently, farmers are less likely to attend to an input when it is “more difﬁcult” to learn its
relationship to yield, e.g., when the relationship is noisy. Thus, one novel prediction of our model,
relative to more standard learning models, is that such barriers may not just slow down the speed
of learning, but shut it down entirely.
2.1.2 Learning from Others
In addition to learning through their own experience, the farmer could learn from observing others.
Consider a useful benchmark: the farmer can observe someone who actively experiments with
different input choices, sidestepping the issues that arise from insufﬁcient experimentation. To
match the main application, suppose the farmer learns from an experimental trial conducted by
someone else, who we will label an extension ofﬁcer, on the farmer’s own plot. We continue to
assume a two period model. In the ﬁrst period, assuming that N/S ≡ n is integer-valued, the
10ofﬁcer randomly assigns n pieces of land to input level s =1 , n to level s =2 , and so forth. The
farmer’s only choice in that period is whether to attend to the input level relative to yield. In the
second period, the farmer chooses the input level. There are two regimes: one in which the ofﬁcer
presents the farmer with results from the experimental trial prior to his choice of input (“learning
by summary”) and one in which he does not (“learning by observing”). The farmer knows the
regime he is in. We start by discussing the learning by observing regime which is summarized in
Timeline 2.
1 2 
Extension officer 
performs trial on 
farmer’s plot and 
farmer chooses 
whether to attend to 
the relationship 
between s and yield. 
Farmer chooses input 
levels.  
Timeline 2: Learning by Observing
Proposition 2. If the farmer would not have attended to any input level when learning by doing,
then he also may not in the learning by observing regime: If π is sufﬁciently low or e and m are
sufﬁciently large, then the farmer does not attend to the input level applied to any piece of land in
the learning by observing regime. Such a farmer’s posterior expectation of f(s) does not vary in
s, and he chooses not to measure the input in the second period.
Proposition 2 says that when the farmer’s failure to learn the relationship between the input
level and yield is a consequence of selective attention, a demonstration that targets experimenta-
tion alone may be ineffective.9 An inattentive farmer already experiments, albeit unintentionally,
and does not learn the relationship between the input level and yield despite having access to freely
9This analysis implicitly assumes that the farmer does not update his prior as a result of his trial participation.
There are reasons to believe this assumption held in our experimental setting, as discussed below.
11available information which would aid in forming a belief about this relationship. Thus, exoge-
nously providing such a farmer with this same information, in essentially the same way, may not
change his beliefs.
Prediction 3. Farmers may not learn much from observing experimental trials that exogeneously
vary inputs.
Adding Summary Policies that make it easier for the farmer to learn the empirical relationship
between the input level and yield may be more effective. Consider a regime (the “learning by
summary” regime that is described in Timeline 3) where, in addition to performing an experimental
trial on a farmer’s plot, the ofﬁcer calculates and presents the farmer with detailed results from the
trial prior to his second period input choice. Namely, the farmer is told the level s∗ that achieved
the greatest sample average yield, as well as the corresponding sample average ¯ ys∗. Since the cost
of keeping track of the input relative to yield for a given piece of land is e, it is natural to assume
that the cost of attending to (¯ ys∗,s ∗) is also e.
1 2 
Extension officer 
performs trial on 
farmer’s plot and 
farmer chooses 
whether to attend to 
the relationship 
between s and yield. 
Extension officer 
presents farmer with a 
summary of the trial’s 
results and farmer 
chooses whether to 
attend to the summary. 
He then chooses input 
levels.  
Timeline 3: Learning by Summary
Under certain assumptions (e.g., σ2
ε =0 ), (¯ y,¯ ys∗,s ∗) is a sufﬁcient statistic relative to the
farmer’s second-period decision (i.e., he will make the same choice whether he knows all of h or
just(¯ y,¯ ys∗,s ∗)). ThisstatementisformalizedandprovedinAppendixA.Undertheseassumptions,
while the expected beneﬁt of attending to the ofﬁcer’s recommendation is the same as that of
12keeping track of the input applied to each piece of land, the cost is lower by a factor of N (the
number of pieces of land). This observation lies at the root of the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. A farmer is more likely to attend to information that helps him estimate the rela-
tionship between the input level and yield when he is presented with summary statistics of results
from the experiment: Supposing σ2
ε =0 , a farmer who would not keep track of the input level
applied to any piece of land in the learning by observing regime may attend to (s∗, ¯ ys∗) in the
learning by summary regime; a farmer who would not attend to (s∗, ¯ ys∗) in the learning by sum-
mary regime would also not keep track of the input level applied to any piece of land in the learning
by observing regime. A farmer who attends to (s∗, ¯ ys∗) either uses s∗ in the second period or does
not measure.
Proposition 3 shows that highlighting features of the data that the farmer had seen but failed to
notice can be quite useful. The fact that it is enough to present the farmer with (¯ ys∗,s ∗) for these
purposes (i.e., that (¯ y,¯ ys∗,s ∗) is a sufﬁcient statistic) is rather speciﬁc to assumptions about the
farmer’s prior as well as the environment. More generally, a selectively attentive farmer is more
likely to learn from some sufﬁcient statistic relative to his second period-decision so long as it is
less costly to process this statistic than to attend to the input level applied to every piece of land.
Prediction 4. Farmers are more likely to learn from summaries of experimental trial results.
2.2 Summary of Predictions
The model suggests ways to diagnose and predict failures to notice, and yields the following pre-
dictions, which we test in our main application:
1. Farmers may not attend to all dimensions of the production function.
2. When farmers do not attend to an input dimension, choices along that dimension may be far
from optimal. When farmers attend, their choices are more likely to be optimal.
133. Farmers may not learn much from observing experimental trials that exogeneously vary
inputs.
4. Farmers are more likely to learn from summaries of trial results.
3 Experimental Design and Data
3.1 Setting
Our experiment takes place with seaweed farmers in the Nusa Penida district in the province of
Bali, Indonesia. The farmers in this area have been growing seaweed since it was introduced in
the early 1980s. Most farmers initally grew a variety called spinosim, but some have moved to a
different strain called cottoni, due to some combination of buyer advice and government and NGO
extension programs. While there are different production methods, most farmers in this area use
the bottom method: in each plot, the farmers drive wooden stakes in the shallow bottom of the
ocean, and then attach lines across the stakes. They then take raw seaweed from the last harvest
and cut them into pods. The farmers then plant these pods at a given interval on the lines. The
optimal pod size can be determined by numerous factors: for example, bigger seedlings may result
in higher yields in still water, but may be more likely to break (or be lost completely) in ocean
locations that face signiﬁcant waves. After planting, the farmers then tend their crops (remove
debris, etc.). About 35 to 40 days later, the farmers harvest the seaweed, dry it, and then sell it to
local buyers.
We became interested in this process for several key reasons. First, there had been a series
of extension programs conducted in Indonesia, which provided advice to farmers on different as-
pects of farming, including optimal pod size, harvest timeframe, distance between pods and lines,
etc. Few farmers followed the advice, and we were interested in understanding why. Second, this
process is similar to that of other crop types, where the many different decisions over inputs and
processes add up to determine yields. Third, seaweed farming has a relatively short crop cycle as
14compared to many other crop types and there are several crop cycles each year. This made it inter-
esting to study for two reasons: ﬁrst, given the many cycles, there should be ample opportunities
for farmers to learn through their own experimentation. Second, the short crop cycle allowed us to
conduct a trial with farmers and to learn the results relatively quickly.
3.2 Experimental Design
From June 2007 to December 2007, we administered a survey to understand the demographics,
farming practices, and learning practices of seaweed farmers in Indonesia (see Appendix Figure
1 for the project timeline). From a census of about 2706 farmers located in seven villages (24
hamlets), commissioned by us in 2006, we drew a random sample of ﬁve hundred farmers for
the baseline survey, stratiﬁed by hamlet.10 Out of these, 489 were located and participated in the
baseline survey (see Appendix Figure 2 for the sample design). The baseline survey consisted of
two parts: (1) a questionnaire that covered demographics, income, and farming methods, and (2) a
“show and tell” where the enumerators visited one of the farmer’s plots to measure and document
his actual farming methods (see Section 3.3. for the data description).
From the list of farmers that participated in the baseline survey, we randomly selected 117
farmers to participate in an experimental trial to determine the optimal pod size for one of their
plots (stratiﬁed by hamlet). The trials occurred between July 2007 – March 2008, shortly after the
baseline was conducted for each farmer.11 Farmers were told that the enumerators would vary the
seaweed production methods across ten lines within one of their plots, with the farmer’s assistance,
and that they would be presented with the trial results afterwards.12 All of the farmers that we
approached participated in the trials and were compensated for doing so in two ways. First, we
provided the necessary inputs for planting the lines, and guaranteed a given income from each line
10Once the initial 500 farmers were chosen, we showed the list to local village leaders. Those who had migrated
prior to our survey or were no longer involved in seaweed farming were replaced.
11The exact timing of when the trial occurred varied from farmer to farmer given the timing of when a farmer had a
plot free and also by the fact that our team could only manage a certain number of trials concurrently.
12This is consistent with the assumptions underlying Proposition 3, where farmers “know” they will receive a
summary of the trial results, as well as with the practices of many extension services which demonstrate methods to
farmers.
15(that was calculated from our pilot tests), so that the farmers would at least break even. Second,
we provided a small gift (worth $1) to each farmer to account for their time.
Farmers who participated in the trials were randomly assigned into one of two sub-treatments:
sort (65 farmers) and weight (52 farmers). The sort sub-treatment was built around the idea that
farmers had substantial variation in pod size even within their own plots (see Appendix Figure 3
for the distribution of sizes within farmers’ own plots in this sub-treatment). Given this variation,
we wanted to understand whether farmers could achieve a higher yield by systematically using
a speciﬁc size within the support of those already used. Farmers were asked to cut pods as they
usually would for the plot in question, and then the pods were sorted into small, medium and large
groups. Working with the farmers, the enumerators attached the pods into the lines, by group (3
lines with small pods, 4 lines with medium pods, and 3 lines with large pods). The lines were then
planted in the farmer’s plot.
Despite the wide range of pod sizes used within a given farmer’s plot, it is still possible that he
could do better by moving to a size outside that range. The weight subtreatment was designed to
address this issue by testing a broader set of initial pod sizes. To generate variation, the pod weights
were initially set at 40g to 140g (in intervals of 20g) for the ﬁrst few trials. However, in order to
better reﬂect the ranges of weights used by the farmers, the weights were changed to 90g-180g for
spinosim and 90g-210g for cottoni (both in intervals of 30g).13 The pods of different sizes were
randomly distributed across about 10 lines, with the enumerator recording the placement of each
pod. The farmers were present for the trials and saw where each pod was planted on the lines.
In the weight subtreatment, we also tested whether farmers optimized distance between pods.
We compared two distances, 15cm and 20cm, since the average distance between pods at baseline
was around 15cm and past technical assistance programs had suggested larger spacing.
In both trial subtreatments, farmers were told to maintain the plots as they would any other
plot. The enumerators returned to reweigh the seedlings twice while in the sea: once around day
13We ensured that the actual weights of the pods that were planted were within 10 grams of the target weight, and
so it is best to think of these as bins within these averages. This adds some noise to the weight categories, biasing us
against ﬁnding different effects by weight.
1614, and again around day 28 (the exact dates depended on the conditions of the sea). On around
day 35, the seaweed was harvested and weighed for a last time (once again, the date of harvest
varied with conditions in the sea, farmer availability, etc.). Note that, in addition to being present
for the planting, farmers were present for (and, in fact, helped with) the weighing, harvesting, and
recording of results. Thus, they had access to all of the raw information generated by the trials.
In April-May, 2008, we conducted the ﬁrst follow-up survey, which was designed to test
whether farmers changed any of their methods after participating in a trial (see data section for
details). These changes would have happened in the cycle after the trial: farmers would have had
time to incorporate anything they learned on their own from the trial into the next cycle. This was
conducted with a subsample of 232 farmers, which included all of the farmers who participated in
the trials, as well as an additional set of farmers who were randomly selected from the baseline as
a control group; 231 farmers completed the survey.
In May to June, 2008, we provided the results to the farmers. An enumerator gave each farmer
a summary table that provided information on the returns from different methods and that high-
lighted which method had the highest yields.14 The enumerators talked through the results with
the farmers, describing the average weight of the pods that they typically used and the difference
between that pod weight and the optimal pod weight (note that the optimal pod weight for sort-
ing trials was the average of the optimal size conditional on the optimum being small, medium or
large). For the weight trials, they were also told whether the optimal distance between pods was
15cm or 20cm. Appendix Figure 4 presents examples of the summary tables.
Approximately two months after the results were given to the farmers (July – August 2008),
we conducted a second follow-up survey to determine if they changed their methods as a result of
having received their trial results. Out of the original 232 farmers, 221 were found.
14We worked with a local NGO, who provided extension services to seaweed farmers and worked with us in con-
junction for this survey, to design a simple, easy to understand table to summarize the trial results.
173.3 Data, Sample Statistics and Randomization Check
3.3.1 Data
Baseline Survey: This consisted of two parts: (1) a household questionnaire and (2) a “show
and tell” where the enumerators visited one of the farmer’s plots to document the actual farming
methods.
The household questionnaire consisted of several modules. In the ﬁrst section, we collected ba-
sic demographic information (household size, educational background, etc). In the second section,
we collected data on how the farmer became involved in seaweed farming and how he obtained
his plots, while we questioned the farmer to learn his beliefs on optimal farming methods in the
third section. In the fourth section, we gathered data on each farmer’s production function: la-
bor costs, capital inputs, technologies employed, difference in methods based on seasonality and
plot location, crop yields, etc. Next, we collected data on both learning and experimentation.
The “learning” questions focused on external learning, such as: Where did the farmer gain his
knowledge on production methods? Where does he go to seek new information, or to learn new
techniques? The “experimentation” questions focused on internal learning/learning by doing, such
as: Has the farmer experimented with different techniques? If yes, which types of techniques has
he tried? Did he change his production methods all in one shot, or was it a step-wise process?
Finally, we also collected data on income, expenditures, assets and loans.
After the questionnaire was complete, the enumerator conducted the “show and tell” to docu-
ment the farmer’s actual production methods.15 This typically took about 15 minutes to two hours,
depending on how difﬁcult it was to access a plot. During the show and tell, we collected informa-
tion on the type of line used, the sizes of a random sample of pods, the distance between a random
sample of seedlings, the distance between seaweed lines, and so forth.
15For some farmers, the show and tell was conducted on another day, as a low tide was neccesssary in order to
access the plots.
18Experimental Trial Results: We compiled data from each of the experimental trials. Speciﬁ-
cally, we documented each plot location, where each pod was planted within a plot, and the weight
of each pod during each of the three weighings. As such, we can compute the yield and the return
from each pod that was planted.
Follow-up Surveys: In both follow-up surveys (one after the trial and one after the summary data
was seen), we collected information on farmers’ self-reported changes in farming techniques. Ad-
ditionally, we again conducted the “show and tell” module to determine if the treatments affected
measured methods.
3.3.2 Baseline Sample Statistics and Randomization Check
As Panel A of Table 1 illustrates, most farmers (83 percent) were literate. Most farmers had been
farming for about 18 years, with about half reporting that they learned how to farm from their
parents (Panel B). As is typical in the agricultural sectors in many developing countries, a large
share of farmers (about a quarter) had a loan from the buyer to whom they sell their crop. About a
third of the sample grew the cottoni strand at baseline. The “show and tell” revealed that the mean
pod size was about 105 grams, while both the distance between pods and between lines was about
15 cm.
In Appendix Table 1, we provide a randomization check across the control and both subtreat-
ment groups. We test for differences across the groups on ten variables at the baseline, where
these variables measure demographic information and key farming characteristics. Columns 1 - 3
provide the means for the control, sort and weight groups respectively, while Columns 4 - 6 pro-
vide estimates of the differences in means across groups. As illustrated in Columns 4 through 6,
out of 30 comparisons we consider, 3 are signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level (consistent with what
would be expected by random chance). We additionally compute the p-value from a test of joint
signiﬁcance across all 10 variables; this is reported in the ﬁnal row in Columns 4 - 6. We fail to
reject the null that all the differences are equal to zero for each of the three comparisons.
194 Results
4.1 Tests of the Model
4.1.1 Baseline Results
A basic implication of learning through noticing is that some farmers will not keep track of input
dimensions that inﬂuence returns. Table 2 presents baseline sample statistics for the 489 farm-
ers that were included in this survey. Panels A and B document self-reported beliefs on current
methods and optimal methods. For these questions, we present the percentage of farmers who
were unable to provide an answer in Column 1, and then provide the means, standard deviations,
and number of observations for those who provided an answer in Columns 2, 3, and 4. In addition,
Panel C provides information on whether farmers had previously actively changed their production
practices along a number of dimensions.
Result 1: Farmers only attend to certain dimensions of the production function.
A vast majority of farmers were inattentive to some input dimensions, particularly pod size. Eighty
six percent could not provide an answer for their current pod size at baseline (Column 1 of Panel
A), while 87 percent of farmers did not even want to hazard a guess about what the optimal pod
size should be (Panel B).16 Since many farmers fail to notice key facts about their pod sizes, it is
perhaps unsurprising that a broad range of sizes is observed both across (see Figure 1) and within
(see Appendix Figure 3) farmers, and that only 12 percent indicated they had previously tried
different sizes (Panel C).
On the other hand, farmers appear to have been more attentive to other input dimensions. For
example, they appeared attentive to both the distance between knots that secure the pods to a line
and the distance between lines. Unlike pod size, very few farmers (about 1 to 2 percent) could
not provide an answer for their distance between lines (Panel A). In addition, most farmers had
16In fact, the enumerators commented to us that many farmers could not answer these questions, even when probed
further.
20an opinion about the optimal distance between both the knots and lines (Panel B). Given that the
farmers are relatively more attentive to the distance between knots and lines, we might expect that
the actual distances employed would exhibit less variance than the pod sizes. Using the means and
standard deviations from Table 1 (Panel B), we can compute the coefﬁcient of variation to compare
the relative variances across inputs: the coefﬁcient of variation for the distance between lines (0.13)
and pods (0.10) is much smaller than that for pod size (0.27), indicating that the practices for these
inputs are relatively less variable across farmers. Finally, note that an extremely small percentage
of farmers reported trying out different distances between lines and pods in the past (Table 2, Panel
C), suggesting that social and public learning may contribute to farmers’ beliefs about the optimal
distance between pods and lines.
Why do farmers notice distance, but not pod size? It is hard for us to conclusively say, but
the model suggests some reasons why this may be the case. The model implies that farmers are
less likely to attend to a relationship when the option value is lower or when the cost of paying
attention is higher, both of which plausibly hold when comparing pod size to distance between
pods. For example, our empirical work below suggests there is more heterogeneity in the optimal
pod size than in the optimal distance across farmers, implying a lower value of attending to data
from neighbors’ plots. While this feature may slow down learning in a traditional learning model,
in our model it can completely shut it down. In terms of the costs of attending, a farmer who notices
variation in yields at the end of a crop cycle can look back at whether distance matters since the
distance between knots stays the same through the crop cycle. However, to learn the importance
of pod size, he needs to keep track of the initial size at the time of planting. Independent of the
precise reason, the rest of the empirical analysis proceeds from the idea that farmers were more
likely to attend to distance than to pod size.
Result 2: Farmers fail to optimize along unattended-to dimensions.
A second implication of the model is that when farmers do not attend to some input dimension,
their choices along that dimension can be far from optimal. For the 117 farmers that participated
21in the experimental trials, we have data on optimal pod size. Table 3 summarizes the predicted
percentage income gain from moving away from initial pod sizes.17 Panel A reports this estimate
for farmers in the sort sub-treatment, providing information on both the predicted gain a farmer
could achieve by changing the size of each pod from his baseline average to the best performing
size and the predicted gain by changing the size of each pod from the worst performing size to the
best among sizes used at baseline. Panel B then presents the predicted income gain a farmer could
achieve by changing the size of each pod from his baseline average to the best performing size in
the weight sub-treatment. We provide the median gain for farmers in Column 1, and provide the
conﬁdence interval of the estimate in Column 2.18 Note that, on average, each trial had around
300 pods per farmer so we have a reasonable number of observations with which to calculate
these returns. Additionally, we estimated a regression of yield on size dummies for each farmer
separately, and passed an F-test of joint signiﬁcance in every case.
On net, the results indicate that farmers are potentially forgoing large income gains by not
noticing and optimizing pod size.19 In the sort sub-treatment, the median estimated percentage
gain in income by moving from the average to the best performing size is 7.06, while the median
estimated gain by moving from the worst to the best is 23.3 (Panel A). In the weight sub-treatment,
the estimated gain by moving from the average at baseline to the best size is 37.87 (Panel B).
Given the wide heterogeneity in returns, many individual farmers could even potentially increase
their incomes by much more than what is typical across the farmers: the data suggests that many
farmers are simply losing out on potential returns.20 Most strikingly, the gains from the sort sub-
treatment suggest that farmers would have done much better by systematically using a speciﬁc size
17Note that to compute these predicted changes to income, we make several strong assumptions. First, we assume
that past seaweed prices are consistent with the future ones; this may be unrealistic as the price may fall if all farmers
increase their yields. Second, we assume that farmers do not change other methods (have fewer cycles, harvest earlier,
etc.) if their yields change. Thus, this evidence should be viewed more as suggestive, rather than as the counterfactual
of the change in income if farmers changed their methods.
18Given the wide heterogeneity in the results, the median is likely a better measure of what is typical than the mean.
19Note that in the sort sub-treatment, about half the farmers were told that their most productive bin was their largest
bin, while about 30 percent were told they would be most productive by moving to the smallest bin. Similarly, in the
weight treatment, about 55 percent were told that they should increase their initial sizes.
20Since we use the data to pick the optimal size for each farmer, note that the gains from switching estimate is biased
upwards. However, by the strong law of large numbers it is an asymptotically consistent estimator (as the number of
pods per size per farmer gets large).
22within the support of those already used. As discussed in greater detail below, this fact indicates
that it is unlikely that farmers’ failure to optimize purely reﬂects a failure of experimentation.21
Farmers appear to perform better in setting their distance between pods – a dimension they
seemed to notice at baseline. Results from the weight sub-treatment indicate that, for 80 percent
of farmers, the optimal distance between pods was 15cm. Given that most farmers were at 15cm
to begin with, these data suggest that very few farmers would do better by changing to 20cm.22
Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that many farmers failed to notice pod size and were
not optimizing this size, while many farmers noticed distance between pods and were optimizing
this distance (at least within the support of distances tested in the trial). The results suggest that
inattention contributes to a failure to optimize and hinders learning by doing. We now analyze the
farmers’ response to the experimental trial, which provides a stronger test of the theory.
4.1.2 Response to the Trial
The model predicts how farmers should respond to the experimental trial. Speciﬁcally, we would
expect that participating in the trial by itself may not have large effects on future behavior if farm-
ers tend not to notice the dimensions they fail to optimize. However, farmers should be more likely
to respond when they are presented with a summary of the trial ﬁndings, as the summary is easier
to process.23 When farmers respond, they should bring their practice more in line with what per-
21However, comparing the gains-from-switching estimates across sort and weight sub-treatments indicates that
farmers may have done even better by moving to a size outside of the support of those already used, which can be
interpreted as suggesting that a lack of experimentation also contributes to a failure to optimize.
22Given that there appears to be substantial heterogeneity across farmers in the optimal size (see Appendix Figure
5), this fact is also suggestive that there is more heterogeneity across farmers in the optimal size than the optimal
distance between pods.
23The prediction that farmers will respond more to the trial plus the summary by more than to the trial by itself relies
in part on an assumption that simply being asked to participate in the trial does not signiﬁcantly draw farmers’ attention
to pod size – i.e., being asked to participate does not lead farmers to signiﬁcantly update the probability they place on
pod size mattering, π. While similar assumptions may not hold in other contexts (see, e.g., Zwane et al. 2011), several
pieces of data help build the case for this assumption in this context. As mentioned above, few farmers in other parts
of Indonesia previously took up NGO advice on pod size. Indeed, this was one of the reasons we became interested in
running the current experiment in the ﬁrst place. In fact, very few farmers at baseline (roughly 10 percent) indicated
that they would change their farming methods simply in response to an NGO or government recommendation, or in
response to advice from a friend (Appendix Table 2), while far more farmers (roughly 40 percent) indicated that they
would change their practice in response to results from other plots. These results suggest a hesitation among these
farmers to take advice at face value.
23formed well at the trial. If farmers are further from the optimum for some inputs (such as pod size)
than others (such as distance between pods), we would expect that learning the trial results should
have larger effects on the inputs that are further from the optimum.
Webeginbyexploringtheeffectofparticipatinginatrialonproductionoutcomes. Speciﬁcally,
for each farmer i in hamlet v, we estimate the following model:
Yivt = β0 + β1F1t + β2F2t + β3Trialiv + β4Trialiv ∗ F1t + β5Trialiv ∗ F2t + αv + µivt (10)
where Yivt is the production choice at time t, F1t is an indicator variable that denotes that the
observation comes from the ﬁrst follow-up after the experimental trial, F2t is an indicator variable
that denotes that the observation comes from the second follow-up after the summary ﬁndings
were presented to farmers, and Trialiv is an indicator variable that denotes trial participation. We
also include a hamlet ﬁxed effect, αv, as the randomization was stratiﬁed along this dimension.24
There are two key parameters of interest: β4 provides the effect of participating in the trial prior
to obtaining a summary of the trial results, while β5 provides the effect after these results are
provided.
Table 4 presents these results. In Columns 1 and 2, the outcome of interest is the self-reported
measure of whether the farmer has made any changes in their production techniques.25 In Column
1, we report the coefﬁcient estimates from Equation (10); in Column 2, we report the estimates
from a model that additionally includes farmer ﬁxed effects. Columns 3 and 4 replicate the analysis
in the ﬁrst two columns, but with the enumerator measured pod size as the outcome variable. We
estimate all models using OLS and all standard errors are clustered by farmer.26
24Note that the inclusion of a hamlet ﬁxed effect does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the results; results from speciﬁca-
tions that omit this ﬁxed effect are available upon request.
25This includes pod size, distance between lines and distance between pods.
26The ﬁndings are similiar if we cluster by hamlet instead. The ﬁndings for whether farmers changed their farming
techniques are also similar if we estimate the equation as a probit rather than OLS.
24Results 3 and 4: Participating in the trial by itself had little effect on farmers’ decisions. Pre-
senting farmers with a summary of the trial’s ﬁndings was more effective.
Consistent with the model’s predictions, just participating in the trial had no effect on the sub-
sequent production outcomes, but learning the results led to large changes in production meth-
ods.27We do not observe a signiﬁcant change in self-reported changes to farming techniques from
participating in the trial, prior to when farmers received the summarized results (Table 4, Column
1). However, about 16 percent more farmers reported changing a technique after receiving the re-
sults, which is about one and a half times the mean of the dependent variable (Column 1). Adding
farmer ﬁxed effects does not signiﬁcantly alter the estimated coefﬁcient (Column 2). It is possi-
ble that some of the results from this self-reported measure may be driven by farmers wanting to
please the enumerators after participating in the trial, though this is unlikely as the control group
had also been receiving visits from enumerators to both survey and measure their farming prac-
tices. Nonetheless, we turn to the enumerator measured results, which are less likely to suffer from
this type of bias.
We do not observe a signiﬁcant change in pod size from participating in the trial, prior to
when farmers received the summarized results (Columns 3 and 4). After receiving the summary,
however, pod size increases by about 7 grams (on average) for those those in the treatment group,
relative to the control. This is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level in the basic speciﬁcation (Column
3) and the positive sign of the effect is consistent with the average recommended change in pod size
fromthetrials. However, whilethecoefﬁcientestimateremainsroughlythesame(7.3grams)when
including farmer ﬁxed effects, the signiﬁcance level falls below conventional levels of signiﬁcance
(p-value = 0.14) due to an increase in the standard error (Column 4). Thus, while farmers did not
appear to consider pod size to be an important part of the production process prior to the trials,
providing summary information on their optimal pod size appeared to change their use of this
27We only varied distance between pods in the weight sub-treatment. In the sort sub-treatment, we kept all aspects
of the farmer’s production methods constant, except to sort the pods by their natural variation. As a result, we only
present the distance results in Table 5 where we disaggregate results by the sub-treatments.
25production input.28
We next explore the sort and weight sub-treatments. Here, we provide coefﬁcient estimates
when we include dummy variables for the sort and weight treatments as controls (Siv and Wiv), as
well as the interaction of these variables with the indicators for follow-up status:
Yivt = β0 + β1F1t + β2F2t + β3Siv + β4Wiv + β5Siv ∗ F1t + β6Siv ∗ F2t (11)
+β7Wiv ∗ F1t + β8Wiv ∗ F2t + αv + µivt.
β5 through β8 are the coefﬁcients of interest, providing the effect of the respective sub-treatment
in the respective time period. The ﬁrst two columns report the coefﬁcient estimates where self-
reported change is the outcome of interest, while the next two columns report the speciﬁcations for
enumerator-measured pod size. Distance between pods is the outcome variable in Columns 5 and 6
(note that this was only tested in the weight sub-treatment). We present results with (odd columns)
and without (even columns) individual ﬁxed effects; standard errors are clustered by farmer.
The ﬁndings are consistent with the predictions of the model. Farmers do not appear to make
signiﬁcant changes in production methods simply from participating in either type of trial (Column
1 and Column 2). However, in both types of trials, they report making large and signiﬁcant changes
in their production techniques after they are presented with the results. Likewise, we ﬁnd no
effect of merely participating in the trial on enumerator measured pod size (Columns 3 and 4), but
observe positive effects of being presented with the trial’s results (while the effect in the weight
28In Appendix Table 3, we disaggregate the results by whether farmers were told to increase or decrease pod size
in the follow-ups. To do so, we interact the interaction of the treatment and follow-up variables with an indicator
variable that denotes whether the farmer should increase their pod size (Increase), controlling for the main effect of the
recommendation (as well as all double interactions between the recommendation and the treatment variable and the
recommendation and the follow-up variable). Once again, we present results with (Column 1) and without (Column 2)
individual ﬁxed effects; all standard errors are clustered at the farmer level. We observe that farmers who were told to
increasepodsizedidsobothaftertheﬁrstandsecondfollow-up. However, therecommendationitselfisanendogenous
variable; thus, itispossiblethatthisissimplycapturingthefactthatiffarmersarerandomizingwithrespecttopodsize,
those who "should go bigger" are those who had abnormally low draws of pod size at baseline. Thus, in expectation,
those farmers would in fact go bigger the next period even if they continue to randomize. Therefore, these results are
difﬁcult to interpret.
26sub-treatment goes in the right direction, the effect is only signiﬁcant in the sort sub-treatment).
Finally, we ﬁnd no effect of the weight treatment on the enumerator measured distance between
pods in either period. This is consistent with the model: Unlike pod size, farmers appeared to
previously notice distance, had beliefs on the optimal distance, and tended to be at the optimum
(at least within the support of distances tested in the trial). As a result, we would not expect large
changes in distance as a result of either participating in the trial or receiving its results. However,
it is important to note that while this result is consistent with the model, the insigniﬁcant result on
distance could also be driven by the smaller sample size.
4.2 Other Interpretations
While the experimental ﬁndings closely track the theory, other explanations of these ﬁndings are
certainly possible. We discuss these alternatives in this Section.
First, perhaps we have missed important costs and, in fact, farmers’ pod size strategy is opti-
mal. For example, perhaps carefully cutting pods to match a given pod size is costly in terms of
labor effort, and, even though yield may be higher, utility would not be. The challenge for this
explanation, however, is the ﬁnding that farmers change their behavior after they were shown the
summary results. If farmers were at the optimum, there would be no reason for them to change
their behavior. This change instead suggests that the farmers themselves felt they were not at the
optimum based on the data they saw.
Second, one might argue that the failure to learn comes from a failure to experiment. While
farmers may be underexperimenting, this alone cannot explain our full set of ﬁndings. In our study,
farmers participate in a trial on their own plots. They see the data from these experiments (or rather,
in our model, they have access to the data), yet this does not affect their behavior. Even more
problematic for this explanation, farmers are constantly experimenting: by not paying attention to
pod size they are generating variation in pod size. In fact, we see from the sort treatment that even
within the range of pod sizes that they normally use, they are not picking the highest yield one.
A third explanation is that maybe the farmers noticed pod size, but are simply innumerate.
27They could not learn from participating in the trial – or even from the natural variation in the data
– because they could not do the math necessary to calculate the return. Note, however, that literacy
rates tend to be high, with about 83 percent of the farmers literate in the baseline. Additionally, the
fact that farmers noticed and were able to optimize on distance suggests that numeracy may not be
the main problem or it would pose a problem along this dimension as well.
Perhaps the biggest stumbling block for all these (and other) explanations is the link between
failures to learn and self-reported knowledge. Our theory makes a clear prediction: failures to learn
will be centered on dimensions that people lack knowledge of, as in the case of pod size. While
other explanations may explain why people may fail to learn (or even fail to learn from experiments
they participate in), it is less clear why those failures would be linked to what is noticed. Limited
attention appears to be the most plausible explanation of this key fact. In addition to our model,
other models of inattention could produce similar effects (e.g., Sims 2003 or Gabaix 2011). As
typically written, these other models would have trouble explaining why farmers did not attend to
pod size when it is so important, since such models typically combine inattention with a sort of
rational expectations assumption. This feature is not inherent to the precise way they formalize
inattention, however. In principle, it seems possible to combine models such as theirs with a model
of learning the production function in a way that would generate results that are similar to ours.
What these data do single out is a model that links what is noticed to what is learned.
5 Model Extensions and Further Applications
This section presents extensions to the basic model that are important in settings outside of the
main empirical application, and discusses further applications.
5.1 Adopting a Technology
So far, we have taken the technology adoption decision as given. Now suppose that in addition to
deciding how to use a technology, the farmer also decides whether to use it. Extend the learning
28by doing model so that, each period, the farmer faces an additional decision of whether to farm at
all. If he does not farm, he receives payoff ¯ u, normalized to equal 0.
To limit the number of cases considered, suppose that µ>0, which implies that the farmer
will farm in the ﬁrst period. Recalling that s0 denotes the input level that maximizes the true
production function, f0(s), further suppose that max
￿
f0(s0) − m, 1
S
￿
s￿ f0(s￿)
￿
= f0(s0)−m>
0, so a farmer that employs the best practices is better off farming than not given the underlying
technology, and using a particular input level rather than not measuring.
Whether a selectively attentive farmer decides to adopt a proﬁtable technology depends on
whether he attends to the proper inputs. We will say that, given what a farmer selectively attends
to, a technology is ﬁlter incongruent if it would no longer be proﬁtable if the farmer only optimizes
with respect to attended to inputs and randomizes with respect to the other inputs. Formally:
Deﬁnition 5.1. Fix whether the farmer attends to the input level in the initial period. The technol-
ogy is ﬁlter incongruent if the farmer does not attend and 1
S
￿
s￿ f0(s￿) < 0.
Intuitively, the farmer is less likely to adopt a ﬁlter incongruent technology. While these tech-
nologies would be proﬁtable if adopted correctly, the farmer will not learn to optimize them be-
cause he fails to attend to important input dimensions and thus believes that they are unproﬁtable.
To formalize this intuition, we will assume away tangential technical issues by simplifying the
farmer’s space of potential strategies as well as the environment.
Assumption 5.1 (Symmetry). The farmer is restricted to using strategies that are symmetric across
pieces of land in a given period. For example, if he does not measure or attend to the input level
applied to piece of land p￿ at t =1 , then he does not measure or attend to the level applied to piece
of land p￿￿ at t =1 .
Assumption 5.2 (Deterministic environment). If the farmer does not measure the input level ap-
plied to any piece of land, then N/S = n pieces of land are randomly assigned to input level s =1 ,
n to s =2 , etc. Further, σ2
ε =0 .
29Assumption 5.1 simpliﬁes matters by helping to guarantee that the farmer ﬁnds it optimal not to
measure particular input levels when indifferent between them. Assumption 5.2 is more important
and greatly simpliﬁes the presentation and proofs by implying that the farmer’s beliefs evolve
deterministically.
Proposition 4. Suppose Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2 hold.
1. If the technology is ﬁlter congruent, then the farmer continues to farm in the second period.
2. Ifthetechnologyis ﬁlterincongruent, thenthe farmerdoesnot continuetofarmin thesecond
period.
Proposition 4 indicates that farmers are less likely to adopt ﬁlter incongruent technologies. As-
suming their priors come from experience with other technologies, this suggests that they are less
likely to adopt technologies when the relevant inputs differ from those of technologies they have
experience with. This provides one reason why farmers may be quicker to adopt technologies that
are “compatible” or “congruent” with current practices (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971, Brandner
and Strauss 1959, Tornatzky and Klein 1982, Fliegel and Kivlin 1966). For example, Brandner
and Strauss (1959) argue that farmers who previously adopted hybrid corn were more likely to
subsquently adopt hybrid sorghum, which could result from the common practices involved in op-
timally planting hybrid varieties. An even more unique implication is that experience with related
technologies may actually be harmful. In the skillet example, experience using non-stick pans may
have “taught” you that the precise details of cleaning the pan do not matter and, therefore, such
“knowledge” may keep you from learning not to use soap. A less experienced cook may actually
be in a better position to notice this crucial detail.
5.2 Learning from a Best-Practice Demonstrator
Suppose now that there is an additional period 0, where the farmer does not farm his own plot,
but rather observes a demonstration by an individual with knowledge of the underlying production
function. We will call this individual a best-practice demonstrator. The best practice demonstrator
30optimally farms the farmer’s plot. Since the farmer is selectively attentive, he may not attend to the
demonstrator’s choice of input s0 and he must thus hold some beliefs over what the demonstrator
does. We assume that, whatever these beliefs are, they reﬂect ignorance in the sense that if he does
not attend to what the demonstrator does, his posterior remains symmetric across input levels. That
is, the farmer has no reason to suspect that any one piece of land is farmed differently than another,
or that any one input level is more likely to be selected than another. This assumption is likely to
be appropriate so long as the demonstrator does not communicate his input choice to the farmer.
(More on this below.)
Again, whether the farmer proﬁtably uses the technology depends on whether it is ﬁlter con-
gruent:
Proposition 5. Consider a farmer who learns from a best-practice demonstrator in period 0 and
then decides whether and how to farm in periods 1 and 2. Under Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2:
1. If the technology is ﬁlter congruent and the farmer farms in period 1, then he continues to
farm in period 2.
2. If the technology is ﬁlter incongruent and the farmer farms but does not attend in period 1,
then he does not farm in period 2.
Remark 5.1. The proof of Proposition 5 makes clear that if the farmer attends to what the demon-
strator does, he necessarily chooses to farm in every period because the expected proﬁtability of
farming is then bounded below by N · (f(s0) − m) > 0 given Assumption 5.2.29 In particu-
lar, our model suggests that behaviors deviating from persistent adoption following a successful
demonstration trial signal a failure to notice.
Proposition 5 indicates that inattentive agents can experience disappointment. For example,
farmers can observe data–perhaps in a demonstration–that leads them to believe that they can use a
technology proﬁtably, but then experience low returns when they try to use it by themselves. Some
29The qualiﬁer “if the farmer farms in period 1” thus handles the case where the farmer does not attend to what the
demonstrator does in period 0.
31prior evidence can be interpreted in this light. Prominently, the fertilizer experiments by Duﬂo,
Kremer and Robinson (2008) study the impact of being invited to observe a trial on a farmer’s
plot and of having a trial performed on one’s own plot. In both cases, they ﬁnd that a modest
percentage of farmers adopt fertilizer the next year. Most interesting for our purposes, though, is
what happens next. Adoption rates decline in subsequent years, implying that farmers could have
disappointed with the results when they tried it on their own. In traditional models, participation in
trials or observing trials is sufﬁcient to encourage adoption. In our model, the impact of this type
of teaching activity depends on whether the technologies are “ﬁlter congruent”; i.e., how well they
line up with the practices agents notice.
5.2.1 Adding Communication
Note that an additional form of communication can help when the technology is ﬁlter incongruent:
the best-practice demonstrator can explain his strategy to the farmer either before or after the
demonstration. When this strategy involves the use of a particular size, s0, then the farmer would
effectively have access to the full history h when updating his beliefs (so long as he processes the
communication). As a result, this farmer is more likely to proﬁtably adopt the technology.
In practice, the demonstrator makes many input choices and communicating these choices to
the farmer is costly (Niehaus 2011). He should only communicate choices along dimensions the
farmer is predisposed not to attend to and are relevant for the task at hand. The effectiveness of
communication is then increasing in the degree to which the demonstrator has knowledge of the
farmer’s mental model; i.e., of what he does and does not attend to. This discussion speaks to
the difﬁculty of agricultural extension (Evenson 2001, Gautam 2000, Anderson and Feder 2004).
Simply sending an extension worker will not guarantee subsequent adoption and proper use of a
proﬁtable technology, even if the worker demonstrates how to use it. For certain technologies,
effective communication is key.
326 Conclusion and Broader Discussion
In this paper, we propose that learning through noticing inﬂuences technology adoption and use.
Beyond the speciﬁc predictions we discuss in the paper, this perspective also forces us to re-think
the role of experience and education in promoting efﬁcient use of technologies.
Learning through noticing alters the standard intuition that experience guarantees effective
technology use (see, for example, Nelson and Phelps 1966, Schultz 1975, Foster and Rosenzweig
2010). While experience will lead people to optimize along dimensions they attend to, our frame-
work and empirical ﬁndings suggest that they may be far from optimizing along the dimensions
that they fail to notice in the ﬁrst place.30 This insight may help us understand persistent differences
in practices across agents. For example, a large literature posits that persistent differences across
farmers must reﬂect differences in endowments or constraints (Griliches 1957, Schultz 1963, Ger-
hart 1975, Croppenstedt et al. 2003). In a recent paper, Suri (2011) argues that heterogeneity in
adoption of hybrid maize in Kenya can be explained by heterogeneity in the beneﬁts and costs of
adoption, which farmers know from experience. We offer an alternative explanation: farmers may
act differently because of differences in what they notice. Quite simply, some farmers may not
notice the very features of the technology that make it proﬁtable.31
Similarly, our analysis has important implications for education. First, it suggests that train-
ing programs can be useful, not only for new technologies, but also for existing technologies that
individuals may have had experience with. To understand when this is the case, we should look
at indicators not only of incorrect beliefs but also of insufﬁcient attention. Moreover, our ﬁnd-
30While bandit models (Gittins 1979) and “local” models of learning by doing (Conley and Udry 2010) also allow
for a persitent failure to optimize, the predictions of such models are very different. In such models, a lack of data
explains the learning failures. To diagnose a problem, we should look for indicators that people do not have sufﬁcient
data available, perhaps due to insufﬁcient experimentation. To solve these problems, we need to provide the relevant
data, or to subsidize their collection. When the binding constraint is instead a failure to notice, looking for instances
where people do not have data available is not sufﬁcient to diagnose problems; providing this data is not enough to
solve them.
31To test this hypothesis, it would be necessary to collect data on what people notice, extending our approach from
the context of seaweed farming. For example, in the context of maize production in Kenya, it would be useful to
understand whether persistent hybrid adopters are more likely to be able to answer questions about what they do
along dimensions important when using hybrids, e.g., about when and how they apply fertilizer or exactly how much
fertilizer they use (Duﬂo et al. 2008). Importantly in this context, even nonadopters are likely to have used hybrid
maize at some point in the past (Suri 2011), and so in principle should be able to answer these questions.
33ings also inform the design of these programs: simply demonstrating how to use a technology or
even listing out dimensions of a technology – many of which the selectively attentive agent may
have already chosen to ignore – may not lead to optimal use. For example, this point may help
explain the difﬁculties (and relatively low success rates) of agricultural extension, which often
provide a lot of information to farmers in a short amount of time (Evenson 1997, Gautam 1999,
Anderson and Feder 2004). Rather, training may be more powerful when it focuses on the aspects
that agents typically fail to notice, and highlights best practices along those dimensions. As such,
future research on training and extension programs should help disentangle how the presentation
and framing of information affects technology use and proﬁtability. Second, our ﬁndings speak
to the fact that general education can also be beneﬁcial through increasing agents’ ability to pro-
cess information along multiple dimensions (through lowering e). For example, Ceci (1991) and
Neisser et al. (1996) provide evidence of a causal link from schooling to general cognitive skills
like working memory, which provides a microfoundation for the widely held belief that schooling
can increase the speed of learning and the ability to adapt to new circumstances (Nelson and Phelps
1966, Schultz 1975, Rosenzweig 1995, Foster and Rosenzweig 2010).
In general, this discussion suggests a more nuanced view of human capital. Simply being able
to encode information along more dimensions – a very basic cognitive capacity – may have effects
on learning capacity across many problems. More sharply, human capital is no longer summarized
by exposure to data or knowledge of facts: Embodied in individuals is information about what to
notice and what to neglect.
34Mean 
Standard 
Deviation N
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A:  Demographic Characteristics
Monthly Per Capita Expenditures 369543 348368 487
Age of HH Head 43.08 11.87 474
Number of Assets 8.09 3.23 487
HH Head is Literate 0.83 0.38 480
Panel B:  Seaweed Farming Practices
Years Farming Seaweed 18.36 7.15 475
Learned to Farm Seaweed from Parents 0.50 0.50 487
Has a Loan from Person to Whom Sells Seaweed 0.28 0.45 353
Number of Days in Previous Cycle 36.74 7.75 487
Mean Distance Between Lines at Baseline (Enumerator Measured) 15.47 1.96 486
Mean Distance Between Pods at Baseline (Enumerator Measured) 15.20 1.47 486
Mean Pod Size at Baseline (Enumerator Measured) 105.74 28.72 487
Cottoni Strand 0.34 0.47 487
Table 1: Baseline Demographic Characteristics and Farming Practices
Notes:  This table provides sample statistics on the farmers' demographic characteristics and seaweed farming practices from the baseline survey.
3
5Percent Unable to 
Provide Answer Mean  Standard Deviation N
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Current Pod Size 86% 118.11 57.01 70
Length of Typical Line 2% 5.05 1.04 481
Distance Between Lines 1% 16.49 3.14 482
Optimal Pod Size 87% 148.26 248.45 63
Optimal Distance Between Knots 2% 15.97 2.84 481
Optimal Distance Between Lines 2% 16.39 3.01 481
Optimal Cycle Length 1% 37.43 7.14 486
Pod Size 0.12 0.32 446
Distance Between Lines 0.01 0.08 484
Cycle Length 0.09 0.28 475
Distance Between Knots 0.04 0.21 478
Strain 0.51 0.50 487
Any Aspect of Farming, Other than Change in Strain 0.19 0.39 487
Any Aspect of Farming 0.57 0.50 487
Notes:  This table provides sample statistics on farmers' responses from the baseline survey.
Table 2:   Baseline Survey Responses on Process and Practices
Panel A:  Self-Reported Current Production Methods
Panel C:   Self-Reported Changes in:
Panel B:   Beliefs on Optimal Production Methods
3
6Median Gain
95 Percent Confidence 
Interval
(1) (2)
Gain from Moving from Average to Recommendation  7.06 [ 2.92 ,14.19]
Gain from Switching from Worst Bin to Best Bin 23.3  [19.00, 28.18]
Gain from Moving from Current Pod Size to Best 37.87 [23.60, 58.86]
Table 3:  Estimated Percent Income Gain from Switching to Trial Recommendations
Panel A:  Sort Treatment Group
Panel B:  Weight Treatment Group
3
7(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trial Participation -0.084 -2.184
(0.051) (3.610)
After Trial -0.146 -0.148 -11.333 -11.661
(0.048)*** (0.057)** (3.003)*** (3.578)***
After Summary Data -0.145 -0.150 -13.587 -13.859
(0.050)*** (0.061)** (2.896)*** (3.496)***
Trial Participation * After Trial 0.072 0.079 -2.051 -1.550
(0.060) (0.071) (4.411) (5.306)
Trial Participation * After Summary Data 0.162 0.171 6.951 7.316
(0.069)** (0.084)** (4.095)* (4.982)
Hamlet Fixed Effects X X
Farmer Fixed Effects X X
Observations 684 684 684 684
Mean of Dependent Variable for the Control Group:
After Trial  0.10 0.10 97.68 97.68
After Summary Data  0.11 0.11 95.39 95.39
Table 4: Effect of Participating in the Trial on Self-Reported Techniques and Measured Pod Size
Changed Farming Techniques Pod Size
Notes: This table provides the coefficient estimates of the effect of treatment on farming methods after the trial (follow-up
1) and after observing the summary data (follow-up 2), conditional on baseline farming methods. The trial participation
dummy indicates that the farmer belongs in either the sort or weight treatment group. Changed Farming Techniques includes
self-reported changes in pod size and distances, while pod size is enumerator measured. All regressions are estimated using
OLS and standard errors are clustered at the farmer level. Statistical significance is denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.10.
3
8(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sort * After Trial 0.089 0.100 3.944 4.657
(0.065) (0.077) (4.461) (5.310)
Weight * After Trial 0.052 0.053 -9.257 -8.929 0.289 0.304
(0.075) (0.089) (6.610) (7.882) (0.328) (0.387)
Sort * After Summary Data 0.141 0.153 10.908 11.768
(0.075)* (0.091)* (4.418)** (5.286)**
Weight * After Summary Data 0.187 0.192 2.185 2.093 0.226 0.172
(0.095)* (0.114)* (5.819) (7.002) (0.303) (0.362)
Hamlet Fixed Effects X X X
Farmer Fixed Effects X X X
Observations 684 684 684 684 499 499
Mean of Dependent Variable for the Control Group:
After Trial 0.10 0.10 97.68 97.68 15.39 15.39
After Summary Data 0.11 0.11 95.39 95.39 15.27 15.27
Table 5:  Effect of Participation in Sort Versus Weight Trials
Changed Farming Techniques Pod Size Distance Between Pods
Notes: This table provides the coefficient estimates of the effect of the different treatments on farming methods after the trial (follow-up 1) and after observing the summary
data (follow-up 2), conditional on baseline farming methods. Changed Farming Techniques includes self-reported changes in pod size and distances, while pod size and
distance between pods are enumerator measured. All regressions are estimated using OLS and standard errors are clustered at the farmer level. Statistical significance is
denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
3
9Figure 1A:  Baseline Pod Sizes
Figure 1B:  Baseline Pod Sizes for Cottoni Growers
Figure 1C:  Baseline Pod Sizes for Spinosim Growers
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40Notes:  The first column of figures provides the full set of returns, while the second column focuses on the bottom 80 percent of the sample.
Figure 2:  Distribution of the Estimated Percent Income Gain from Switching to Trial Recommendations 
Panel A:  Percent Gain from Moving from the Baseline Average to the Recommendation in the Sort Treatment
Panel B:  Percent Gain from Moving from the Lowest Performing to the Highest Performing Bin in the Sort Treatment
Panel C:  Percent Gain from Moving from the Current Pod Size to the Best in the Weight Treatment
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41Control Sort  Weight Col 1 - Col 2 Col 1 - Col 3 Col 2 - Col 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Monthly Per Capita Income) 12.43 12.42 12.67 0.233 -0.016 -0.249
  (1.37) (0.72) (0.76) (0.164) (0.156) (0.138)*
HH Head is Literate 0.79 0.84 0.88 0.093 0.050 -0.043
  (0.41) (0.37) (0.32) (0.059) (0.060) (0.064)
Number of Assets 8.36 7.95 8.28 -0.079 -0.409 -0.330
  (3.15) (3.19) (3.06) (0.511) (0.494) (0.580)
Age of HH Head 43.23 43.95 43.54 0.304 0.718 0.414
  (12.22) (12.14) (11.33) (1.937) (1.905) (2.192)
Years Farming 18.00 18.94 18.27 0.275 0.937 0.662
  (6.96) (7.06) (7.06) (1.183) (1.103) (1.330)
Parents Farmed Seaweed 0.47 0.55 0.53 0.063 0.081 0.019
  (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.083) (0.078) (0.093)
Loans from Someone Sells to 0.31 0.33 0.22 -0.085 0.026 0.111
  (0.46) (0.48) (0.42) (0.088) (0.085) (0.097)
Farms Cottoni 0.34 0.33 0.47 0.135 -0.008 -0.144
  (0.47) (0.47) (0.50) (0.082)* (0.074) (0.091)
Podsize at Baseline 109.01 102.83 112.78 3.777 -6.174 -9.951
  (28.79) (22.57) (38.00) (5.850) (3.884) (5.930)*
Number of Days of Previous Cycle 36.61 36.00 37.08 0.463 -0.612 -1.075
  (8.24) (7.31) (6.54) (1.178) (1.190) (1.281)
P-Value from Joint Test 0.6945 0.6077 0.4027
Appendix Table 1: Regression Check
Mean, by Treatment Group Differences
Notes: This table provides a check on the randomization. Columns 1 - 3 provide the mean and standard deviation of each baseline characteristic for the control
group, sort group, and weight group, respectively. Columns 4 - 6 give the difference in means (and standard errors) between the noted experimental groups. The p-
value for the joint significance of the treatment on all dependent variables is provided in Columns 4 – 6. Statistical significance is denoted by: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.10.
4
2Mean 
Standard 
Deviation N
(1) (2) (3)
Would Not Want to Make any Changes 0.04 0.18 482
Own Initiative 0.02 0.13 482
Pest or Price 0.02 0.13 482
Advice from Friend 0.10 0.30 482
NGO or Government Recommendation 0.11 0.31 482
Seeing Results on the Plots of Other Farmers 0.39 0.49 482
Notes:  This table provides  baseline survey responses on why a farmer may try a new method.
Appendix Table 2:   Reasons Why Farmer May Want to Try a New Method
43(1) (2)
Increase -21.091 -50.976
(4.807)*** (1.851)***
Increase * Trial Participation * After Trial  27.264 27.060
(6.223)*** (7.627)***
Increase * Trial Participation * After Summary Data 19.502 19.242
(5.808)*** (7.149)***
Hamlet Fixed Effects X
Farmer Fixed Effects X
Observations 675 675
Appendix Table 3: Effect of Treatment, by Recommendation
Pod Size
Notes: This table provides the coefficient estimates of the effect of the recommendations from the trial on farming
methods after the trial (follow-up 1) and after seeing the summary data (follow-up 2), conditional on baseline farming
methods. The trial participation dummy indicates that the farmer belongs in either the sort or weight treatment group.
Increase is an indicator variable for being told to increase size. All regressions are estimated using OLS and include the
main effects as well as the double interactions, and standard errors are clustered at the farmer level. Statistical
significance is denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
44Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug
2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008
Baseline
Trials
Follow-Up 1
Follow-Up 2
Appendix Figure 1:  Experimental Design
Appendix Figure 2:  Sample Design
4
5Appendix Figure 3
Notes:  This figure documents the within farmer variation in pod sizes at baseline. For each farmer, it shows the 
average size within the small and large bin in the sort treatment, where farmers are sorted according to the average 
size in their small bin.
46A.  Weight Example
B.  Sort Example
Appendix Figure 4:  Examples of Summarized Trial Results
47Appendix Figure 5:  Distribution of Recommended Pod Sizes in the Weight Treatment
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52A Proofs
Before turning to the proofs, we introduce some notation and a useful lemma.
Across the regimes studied in Section 2, in the second period the farmer will compare
µ
+∗ ≡ max
s￿∈S
E[f(s
￿)|ˆ h] = max
s￿∈S
π
+E[f(s
￿)|ˆ h,P]+( 1− π
+)E[f(s
￿)|ˆ h,NP] (12)
with
¯ µ
+ ≡
1
S
￿
s￿
E[f(s
￿)|ˆ h] (13)
and, for every piece of land, will choose to apply the input level s∗ that achieves µ+∗ if µ+∗−¯ µ+ >
m and will not measure otherwise. Label the event that µ+∗ − ¯ µ+ >mby G and the event that
µ+∗ − ¯ µ+ ≤ m by NG. Further, let
µ
+∗
M ≡ E[f(s
∗)|ˆ h,M] (14)
and
¯ µ
+
M ≡
1
S
￿
s￿
E[f(s
￿)|ˆ h,M] (15)
for M = P,NP. Note that µ
+∗
NP =¯ µ
+
NP given any history and that µ
+∗
P − ¯ µ
+
P >m / π + conditional
on event G.
Lemma A.1. Independent of the regime studied in Section 2:
1. If the farmer does not keep track of the input level applied to any piece of land in the ﬁrst
period, then µ+∗ =¯ µ+ along any history.
2. If the farmer keeps track of the input level in the ﬁrst period, then the probability of event G
tends towards 1 as m tends towards 0 under model P.
53Proof. Part 1. We have
µ
+∗ =m a x
s￿ π
+E[f(s
￿)|ˆ h,P]+( 1− π
+)E[f(s
￿)|ˆ h,NP]
=m a x
s￿ π
+E[θ(s
￿)|ˆ h,P]+( 1− π
+)E[θ|ˆ h,NP],
(16)
and
¯ µ
+ = π
+
￿
1
S
￿
s￿
E[f(s
￿)|ˆ h,P]
￿
+( 1− π
+)
￿
1
S
￿
s￿
E[f(s
￿)|ˆ h,NP]
￿
= π
+
￿
1
S
￿
s￿
E[θ(s
￿)|ˆ h,P]
￿
+( 1− π
+)
￿
1
S
￿
s￿
E[θ|ˆ h,NP]
￿
.
(17)
Comparing (16) with (17), we see that it sufﬁces to show that
E[θ(s
￿)|ˆ h,P]=E[θ(s
￿￿)|ˆ h,P] (18)
for all s￿,s ￿￿ ∈Sand ˆ h consistent with the farmer not keeping track of the input in the ﬁrst period.
But this equality follows from the fact that the farmer’s marginal prior distributions over θ(s￿) and
θ(s￿￿) are the same under model P, as are the likelihoods Pr(ˆ h|θ(s￿)=˜ θ,P) and Pr(ˆ h|θ(s￿￿)=
˜ θ,P) for all s￿,s ￿￿, ˜ θ, and ˆ h =( yp1,∅)N
p=1.
Part 2.
We will consider the learning by doing regime. The proof of this result for the other regimes is
similar but slightly less involved because, in those regimes, n(s) is known rather than stochastic.
Deﬁne µs
P = E[f(s)|ˆ h,P] for all s ∈S , so (µ1
P,µ 2
P,...,µ S
P) is a random variable. Re-order
these µ
j
P in terms of decreasing values, where µ
(i)
P denotes the i-th highest value, so µ
(1)
P ≥ µ
(2)
P ≥
...≥ µ
(S)
P . Clearly, (µ
(1)
P ,µ
(2)
P ,...,µ
(S)
P ) is also a random variable.
By deﬁnition, event NGis the event that µ+∗ − ¯ µ+ ≤ m which is equivalent to the event that
µ
+∗
P − ¯ µ
+
P ≤ m/π
+. (19)
54It turns out that (19) holds only if
|µ
s
P − µ
s￿
P|≤
Sm
π+ for all s,s￿. (20)
To see this, suppose that there exists some s,s￿ such that |µs
P − µs￿
P| >S m / π +. Then, for some
j>0,k>0, we must have µ
(j)
P − µ
(j+k)
P >S m / π +. Now, expanding µ
+∗
P − ¯ µ
+
P, we have
µ
+∗
P − ¯ µ
+
P = µ
(1)
P −
1
S
￿
µ
(1)
P + µ
(2)
P + ...+ µ
(j)
P + ...+ µ
(j+k)
P + ...+ µ
(S)
P
￿
≥ µ
(1)
P −
1
S


µ
(1)
P + ...+ µ
(1)
P ￿ ￿￿ ￿
(j−1)-times
+µ
(j)
P + ...+ µ
(j)
P ￿ ￿￿ ￿
k-times
+µ
(j+k)
P + ...+ µ
(j+k)
P ￿ ￿￿ ￿
S−(j−1)−k-times



=
S − (j − 1)
S
µ
(1)
P −
k
S
µ
(j)
P −
S − (j − 1) − k
S
µ
(j+k)
P
≥
S − (j − 1) − k
S
(µ
(j)
P − µ
(j+k)
P )
>
S +1− (j + k)
S
￿
Sm
π+
￿
≥
1
S
￿
Sm
π+
￿
=
m
π+.
Having established that (19) holds only if (20), we will now show that
lim
m→0Pr
￿
|µ
s
P − µ
s￿
P|≤
Sm
π+ for all s,s
￿|P
￿
=l i m
m￿→0
Pr
￿
π
+|µ
s
P − µ
s￿
P|≤m
￿ for all s,s
￿|P
￿
=0 .
(21)
Note that
Pr
￿
π
+|µ
s
P − µ
s￿
P|≤m
￿ for all s,s
￿|P
￿
≤ Pr
￿
π
+|µ
s
P − µ
s￿
P|≤m
￿ for some s,s
￿ with n(s) > 0|P
￿
,
(22)
so it is enough to establish that the right hand side of this inequality tends towards zero as m￿ → 0.
55By Bayes’ rule, the right hand side of (22) can be expanded as follows (where we let Q(·)
denote Pr(·|n(s) > 0,P)):
Q
￿
π
+|µ
s
P − µ
s￿
P|≤m
￿|π
+ ≥ π
￿
Pr(π
+ ≥ π|P)+Q
￿
π
+|µ
s
P − µ
s￿
P|≤m
￿|π
+ <π
￿
Pr(π
+ <π |P)
for any π ∈ (0,1), which is less than or equal to Q
￿
π|µs
P − µs￿
P|≤m￿|π+ ≥ π
￿
Pr(π+ ≥ π|P)+
Pr(π+ <π |P), which in turn is less than or equal to
Q
￿
π|µ
s
P − µ
s￿
P|≤m
￿|π
+ ≥ π
￿
(1 − p(π)) + p(π) (23)
where p(π)=1−π
π ·
π
1−π. The last inequality follows from the fact that the odds ratio (1 − πt)/πt
is a supermartingale under model P, together with Markov’s inequality.32
Conditional on n(s) > 0, |µs
P −µs￿
P| is a continuous random variable under model P on [0,∞)
(µs
P is a normally distributed random variable and µs￿
P is either an independent normal random
variable or a constant), so
lim
˜ m→0
Pr
￿
|µ
s
P − µ
s￿
P|≤˜ m|n(s) > 0,P
￿
=0 ,
which implies that (23) tends to p(π) as m￿ → 0 for any π. Since it is additionally the case that
p(π) → 0 as π → 0, we have established (21), and hence that the probability of event G tends
towards 1 as m tends towards 0.
￿
Proof of Proposition 1. Label the farmer’s ﬁrst period choice of action by a, which, for every
piece of land, speciﬁes whether the farmer measures and/or attends to the input level applied to
that piece of land. The farmer’s ﬁrst period choice of action, together with his prior and second
32Markov’s inequality says that for any random variable X and a>0, Pr(|X|≥a) ≤ E[|X|]/a. Given that
(1 − πt)/πt is a supermartingale under model P, we have that Pr
￿
1−π
+
π+ ≥ a|P
￿
≤ 1−π
πa , which in turn implies that
Pr
￿
π+ ≤ 1
1+a|P
￿
≤ 1−π
πa , or, changing variables, Pr(π+ ≤ π|P) ≤ 1−π
π ·
π
1−π.
56period strategy (as detailed at the beginning of the Appendix) induces a probability distribution
over outcomes. Label this distribution by Pr
a.
Given action a, the farmer’s ﬁrst period expected ﬂow utility deriving from piece of land p is
µ − δ
a
pmm − δ
a
pee, (24)
where δa
pm is an indicator for whether the input is measured, and δa
pe is an indicator for whether the
farmer keeps track of the input (applied to piece of land p under action a).
Conditional on the farmer’s ﬁrst period action, his second period expected (per-piece of land)
ﬂow utility under model NP is
u
a
NP =P r
a(G|NP)(E
a[µ
+∗
NP|G,NP] − m)+P r
a(NG|NP)E
a[¯ µ
+
NP|NG,NP]
= E
a[¯ µ
+
NP|NP] − mPr
a(G|NP) (since µ
+∗
NP =¯ µ
+
NP)
= µ − mPr
a(G|NP) (by the law of iterated expectations).
(25)
The farmer’s second period expected (per-piece of land) ﬂow utility under model P is
u
a
P =P r
a(G|P)(E
a[µ
+∗
P |G,P] − m)+P r
a(NG|P)E
a[¯ µ
+
P|NG,P]. (26)
It is easy to see that
µ − m ≤ u
a
NP ≤ µ (27)
and
µ ≤ u
a
P ≤ E
a[µ
+∗
P |P]. (28)
A less obvious, but important inequality is that, conditional on the agent keeping track of the input
57level in the ﬁrst period, there exists an ε>0 such that
u
a
P >µ+ ε (29)
for sufﬁciently small m. We will take (29) as given for now, and will establish this inequality at
the end of the proof.
The farmer’s expected utility given action a is
U
a = Nµ−
N ￿
p=1
(δ
a
pmm + δ
a
pee)+N[(1 − π)u
a
NP + πu
a
P]. (30)
When the farmer does not measure or keep track of the input level applied to any piece of land
(a = NE), Lemma A.1 gives us that Pr
NE(G)=0 , which implies that uNE
P = uNE
NP = µ. Thus,
the farmer’s expected utility when he does not keep track of the input level equals
U
NE =2 Nµ. (31)
If the farmer takes some other action (i.e., one in which he does keep track of the input level)
his expected utility is bounded above by
N{µ +( 1− π)µ + π max
a E
a[µ
+∗
P |P]}−e (32)
by (27), (28), and the fact that e ≤ m. It is easy to see that (32) is less than UNE for sufﬁciently
small π or sufﬁciently large e. Thus, the farmer chooses not to measure or keep track of the input
level for sufﬁciently small π or sufﬁciently large e, m. When the farmer does not measure or keep
track of the input level, Lemma A.1 tells us that his posterior expectation of f(s) will not vary in s
and he chooses not to measure in the second period.
We now want to show that the farmer keeps track of the input level applied to some piece of
land in the ﬁrst period so long as π is sufﬁciently large and/or e and m are sufﬁciently low. The
58utility the farmer achieves through the best strategy in which he keeps track of some input level in
the ﬁrst period is bounded below by the utility from the strategy that includes not measuring, yet
attending to the input level applied to every piece of land in the ﬁrst period. Label the expected
utility from this strategy by UE. We have that
U
E = N[µ − e +( 1− π)u
E
NP + πu
E
P]
≥ N[µ − e +( 1− π)(µ − m)+πu
E
P] (by inequality (27))
>N[2µ − e − (1 − π)m + πε] for sufﬁciently low m(by inequality (29)).
(33)
The right hand side of the above inequality is increasing in π and decreasing in m and e. Further,
the right hand side exceeds UNE when π is sufﬁciently large (ﬁxing sufﬁciently low e,m) or e and
m are sufﬁciently low (ﬁxing π), thus establishing that the farmer keeps track of the input level
applied to a piece of land in the ﬁrst period so long as π is sufﬁciently large (ﬁxing sufﬁciently low
e,m) or e and m are sufﬁciently low (ﬁxing π). When he keeps track of the input level applied to a
given piece of land, his posterior expectation almost surely varies in s when σ2
ε > 0 because yield
is normally distributed given s￿ and f0(s￿), and is not perfectly correlated across pieces of land. It
is obvious that, in this case, the farmer either measures the input level with the highest associated
posterior distribution of f(s) in the second period or does not measure.
It only remains to show that (29) holds. Let Gδ be the event that µ+∗ − ¯ µ+ >m+ δ and G¬δ
be the event that m<µ +∗ − ¯ µ+ ≤ m + δ. We can write
u
a
P =P r
a(G
δ|P)(E
a[µ
+∗
P |G
δ,P] − m)+P r
a(G
¬δ|P)(E
a[µ
+∗
P |G
¬δ,P] − m)
+P r
a(NG|P)E
a[¯ µ
+
P|NG,P]
≥ µ +P r
a(G
δ|P)δ,
(34)
with strict inequality whenever Pr
a(G|P) > 0. The inequality follows from the fact that µ
+∗
P −
¯ µ
+
P >m+ δ conditional on event Gδ, together with the law of iterated expectations.
Lemma A.1 implies that, when the farmer keeps track of the input level in the ﬁrst period, there
59exists some p,δ, ¯ m such that Pr
a(Gδ|P) ≥ p for all m ≤ ¯ m, so (34) implies that ua
P >µ+ pδ for
all m ≤ ¯ m. Setting ε = pδ completes the proof.
￿
Proof of Proposition 2. Using arguments and notation analogous to those used in the proof of
Proposition 1, the farmer’s expected utility if he does not attend to the input level applied to any
piece of land in the ﬁrst period equals
U
NA =2 Nµ, (35)
while his expected utility if he attends to some input level is bounded above by
N{µ +( 1− π)µ + π max
a E
a[µ
+∗
P |P]}−e. (36)
Since (36) is less than UNA for sufﬁciently small π or sufﬁciently large e, the farmer does not
attend to the input level for sufﬁciently small π or large e,m in the learning by observing regime.
Thus, a farmer who would not have attended to the input level absent exogenous experimentation
also may not in this regime. Finally, such a farmer’s posterior expectation of f(s) does not vary in
s by Lemma A.1.
￿
Before proving Proposition 3, we state and prove an intermediate Lemma.
Lemma A.2. Assume that σ2
ε =0 . Given any history h, the farmer will make the same decision in
the second period whether he knows h, or just ((yp1,∅)N
p=1, ¯ ys∗,s ∗) ≡ ˜ h.
Proof. Recall that, in the second period, the farmer will choose a level s∗ that achieves µ+∗ if
µ+∗ − ¯ µ+ >mand will not measure otherwise. It will be helpful to write µ+∗ and ¯ µ+ as functions
60of information known by the farmer, so
µ
+∗(h) = max
s￿∈S
E[f(s
￿)|h],
µ
+∗(˜ h) = max
s￿∈S
E[f(s
￿)|˜ h],
etc. It sufﬁces to show that µ+∗(h)=µ+∗(˜ h) and ¯ µ+(h)=¯ µ+(˜ h) for all h.
We have
µ
+∗(h)=m a x
s￿∈S
π
+(h)
￿
σ2
ε
σ2
ε + nσ2µ +
nσ2
σ2
ε + nσ2 ¯ ys￿
￿
+( 1− π
+(h))
￿
σ2
ε
σ2
ε + Nσ2µ +
Nσ2
σ2
ε + Nσ2 ¯ y
￿
= π
+(h)
￿
σ2
ε
σ2
ε + nσ2µ +
nσ2
σ2
ε + nσ2 ¯ ys∗
￿
+( 1− π
+(h))
￿
σ2
ε
σ2
ε + Nσ2µ +
Nσ2
σ2
ε + Nσ2 ¯ y
￿
.
(37)
From (37), we see that, to calculate µ+∗(h), the farmer only needs to know (s∗, ¯ ys∗, ¯ y,π+(h)),
which he can calculate from ˜ h so long as σ2
ε =0 . The only part of this statement that requires
explanation is why he can calculate π+(h) from ˜ h. This follows from the facts that, given σ2
ε =0 ,
we have (i)
π
+(h)=

  
  
1 if there exists s,s￿such that ¯ ys ￿=¯ ys￿
0 otherwise
and (ii) there exists s,s￿ such that ¯ ys ￿=¯ ys￿ if and only if ¯ ys∗ ￿=¯ y. Thus, µ+∗(h)=µ+∗(˜ h).
We also have
¯ µ
+(h)=
1
S
￿
s￿
￿
π
+
￿
σ2
ε
σ2
ε + nσ2µ +
nσ2
σ2
ε + nσ2 ¯ ys￿
￿
+( 1− π
+)
￿
σ2
ε
σ2
ε + Nσ2µ +
Nσ2
σ2
ε + Nσ2 ¯ y
￿￿
= π
+(˜ h)
￿
σ2
ε
σ2
ε + nσ2µ +
nσ2
σ2
ε + nσ2 ¯ y
￿
+( 1− π
+(˜ h))
￿
σ2
ε
σ2
ε + Nσ2µ +
Nσ2
σ2
ε + Nσ2 ¯ y
￿
.
(38)
From (38) we see that, to calculate ¯ µ+(h), the farmer only needs to know ¯ y and ¯ ys∗ when σ2
ε =0 ,
which can be calculated from ˜ h. Thus, ¯ µ+(h)=¯ µ+(˜ h). ￿
61Remark A.1. From the proof of Lemma A.2, we can see that the “sufﬁcient statistics” statement
would continue to hold if, instead of σ2
ε =0 , the farmer did not update model weights in response
to new information (just beliefs given a model).
Proof of Proposition 3. The farmer essentially has four options in the ﬁrst period:
1. Keep track of the input level applied to some pieces of land.
2. Keep track of the input level applied to some pieces of land, and attend to recommendation.
3. Don’t keep track of the input level, but attend to recommendation.
4. Don’t keep track of the input level or attend to recommendation.
By Lemma A.2, options 1 and 2 are dominated by 3, so the farmer compares 3, attending to the
recommendation (a = R), with 4, not attending to the recommendation (a = NR).
The farmer’s expected utility if he does not attend to the recommendation is UNR =2 Nµby
now familiar arguments.
If the farmer attends to the recommendation, then the probability distribution over his second
period action is the same as if he kept track of the input level applied to every piece of land by
Lemma A.2. However, the cost of attending to the recommendation is only e – the same as the
cost of attending to the input level applied to a single piece of land. Thus, the farmer’s expected
utility if he attends to the recommendation, UR, is greater than his expected utility under the best
strategy where he attends to the input level applied to at least one piece of land under the learning
by observing regime, UA.
Proposition 3 is then an immediate implication of the fact that UR ≥ UA. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. Given the symmetric strategy assumption (Assumption 5.1), the farmer
has three options in the ﬁrst period:
1. Do not measure or attend to the input level applied to any piece of land.
2. Do not measure, but attend to the input level applied to every piece of land.
623. Measure a particular input s on every piece of land.
Together with the fact that the farmer’s prior is symmetric across input levels and e<m , As-
sumption 5.2 guarantees that option 2 dominates option 3. Under these assumptions, the farmer is
guaranteed to learn the optimal input level under option 2 but not option 3, and option 2 is associ-
ated with a lower cost than option 3. As a result, the farmer does not measure the input level in the
ﬁrst period.
If the farmer does not measure but attends to the input level in the ﬁrst period, then he learns
the optimal level (by Assumption 5.2) and continues to farm in the second period, using input level
s0.
If the farmer does not attend to the input level in the ﬁrst period, then µ+∗ =¯ µ+ = 1
S
￿
s￿ f0(s￿)
(by Assumption 5.2). If the technology is ﬁlter congruent, then ¯ µ+ > 0 and the farmer continues
to farm in the second period; if the technology is ﬁlter incongruent, then ¯ µ+ < 0 and the farmer
does not continue to farm.
￿
Proof of Proposition 5. If the farmer attends to the input in period 0, then, by Assumption 5.2, he
learns for sure that he is guaranteed a (per-piece-of-land) proﬁt of f0(s0) − m>0 by farming
and using input s0. Since this proﬁt exceeds the zero proﬁt he would earn by not farming, he will
continue to farm forever.
If the farmer does not attend to the input in period 0, then he will not measure the input if he
farms in period 1. If the technology is ﬁlter congruent, then he learns that he is guaranteed an
income of at least 1/S
￿
s￿ f0(s￿) > 0 by farming, and will continue to proﬁtably farm in period
2. If the technology is ﬁlter incongruent and he farms but does not attend in period 1, then the
farmer’s expected proﬁt is negative if he continues to farm in period 2 (since
￿
s￿ f0(s￿) < 0), so
he stops farming.
￿
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